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The Myth of Tactical Litigation in UK Takeovers 
 
Jonathan Mukwiri* 
 
The implementation of the Takeover Directive in the UK has resulted in ending the 
so-called self-regulation of takeovers.  This change of regulatory framework was 
always feared for having the potential to create a culture of tactical litigation that 
would be detrimental to takeovers.  In this article, these fears are assessed against the 
measures that prevailed at common law before the implementation of the Directive 
and against the measures in the Directive as implemented by the Companies Act 
2006.  This article concludes that it is unlikely that the implementation of the 
Directive will cause a litigation culture to arise in the regulation of UK takeovers. 
 
A. INTRODUCTION 
 
This article is concerned with the regulation of takeovers in the UK under the 
European Community Directive on Takeover Bids (the “Directive”),1 as implemented 
by the Companies Act 2006 (the “CA 2006”).2  In particular, the article examines the 
question of whether implementation of the Directive creates the potential for a culture 
of tactical litigation in takeover bids to arise.  Tactical litigation may broadly be 
described as “legal proceedings taken by parties to a bid with a view to frustrating or 
hampering the bid or the defence of a bid”.3  The implementation of the Directive in 
the UK has resulted in ending the so-called self-regulation of takeovers.  This change 
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1
 Directive 2004/25/EC OJ L 142/12. 
2
 Part 28 of the CA 2006 which implements the Directive came into force on 6th April 2007, 
replacing The Takeovers Directive (Interim Implementation) Regulations 2006 (IS 
1183/2006) that had come into force on 20 May 2006 to coincide with the deadline 
required of Member States to implement the Directive. 
3
 Company Law Implementation of The European Directive on Takeover Bids: A Consultative 
Document (London, DTI, January 2005), 15, para.2.32. 
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of regulatory framework was always feared for having the potential to create a culture 
of tactical litigation that would be detrimental to takeovers. 
This article begins by putting self-regulation in its historical context, and then 
examines the basis of the perceived fear of litigation.  It then examines the approach 
taken at common law to restrict tactical litigation, it analyses the provisions in the 
Directive designed to prevent tactical litigation, and examines the implementation of 
those provisions under the CA 2006.  The article then highlights a few examples 
showing the extent to which the Takeover Panel is able to maintain its self-regulation 
qualities even after the change to statutory-regulation.  It then assesses whether the 
split jurisdiction provided by the Directive is likely to cause regulatory difficulties.  In 
assessing the perceived fear of tactical litigation, this article concludes that it is very 
unlikely that the Directive, as implemented by the CA 2006, will cause a litigation 
culture in UK takeovers. 
 
B. HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF TAKEOVER REGULATION 
 
The regulation of takeovers in the UK can be traced from the 1960s, and its history is 
well documented.
4
  Since 1968, takeovers have been regulated by the Takeover Panel 
on Takeovers and Mergers (the “Panel”), a regulatory body set up in response to 
mounting concern about unfair practices in the conduct of takeover offers.
5
  These 
unfair practices were mainly characterised by defensive measures adopted by offeree 
boards and aimed at frustrating takeover bids.  The real losers in these practices were 
the shareholders, as often shareholders were not consulted or given the opportunity to 
decide on the bids. 
                                                 
4
 See R Falkner, “Judicial review of the takeover Panel and self-regulatory organisations” 
(1987) 2 Journal of International Banking Law 103, 104-105. 
5
 The history of takeover regulation in the UK is briefly documented in various publications 
of the Panel on their website <http://www.thetakeoverpanel.org.uk> accessed on 20 April 
2006. 
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By 1959, a solution to these unfair practices was found through the 
requirements of the Notes on Amalgamation of British Businesses, a measure 
introduced by the Governor of the Bank of England.  The rules in these Notes, 
established in 1959, were revised in 1963 to cater for equal treatment in requiring the 
offeror to make equivalent offers to other classes of shareholders whose shares had 
not been purchased after a certain controlling stake had been obtained.  When these 
measures under the Notes proved inadequate to protect shareholders, the Panel was 
set up in March 1968, and a body of rules contained in the City Code on Takeovers 
and mergers (the “Code”) thereafter drawn up in 1985. 
The Panel‟s function has always been that of ensuring the fair conduct of a 
takeover bid from the point of view of the shareholders.  The principal objective of 
the Code is to give shareholders a fair opportunity of considering an offer on its 
merits.  The structure of the Panel and the Code is designed to allow the necessary 
degree of flexibility of application and interpretation of takeover rules.  It has rightly 
been stated that “untrammelled by the procedural and precedential niceties of the 
courtroom, the Panel responds in a flexible and well-informed fashion to disputes and 
governs their resolution in „real time‟”.6  The importance and meaning of the Panel‟ 
„flexible‟ approach has been explaining by Amour and Skeel as follows: 
 
“[T]he flexibility of the Panel‟s approach means that it is able to adjust its 
regulatory responses both to the particular parties before it, and to the 
changing dynamics of business within the City of London.  Takeover 
participants are expected to comply with the „spirit‟ as well as the letter of 
the Code, on which they are expected to seek guidance from the Panel.  
Because they are actively engaged with the parties, the Panel‟s Executive are 
able to tailor the regulatory requirements (outlining compliance conditions or 
waiving rules, as appropriate) to the circumstances of a particular case.  
Moreover, the Panel‟s Code Committee is charged with regular and 
proactive updating of the Code‟s provisions to reflect changes in the 
marketplace”.7 
 
Flexibility of approach to regulation of takeovers, and speed and certainty of decision-
making of the Panel are said to have “been the hallmark of the Panel‟s takeover 
                                                 
6
 J Amour and DA Skeel, “Who Writes the Rules for Hostile Takeovers, and Why? – The 
Peculiar Divergence of US and UK Takeover Regulation” (2007) 95 Georgetown Law 
Journal 1727, 1729. 
7
 J Amour and DA Skeel, supra n 6, 1745. 
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regulation”,8 which the Panel has been keen to retain in the transition from self-
regulation to statutory regulation as envisaged by the implementation of the Directive 
as of 20 May 2006.
9
 
The implementing of the Directive has placed takeover regulation and the 
Panel on a statutory footing for the first time.  The change from self-regulation to 
statutory regulation is hardly noticeable, given that the CA 2006 has replicated, to the 
greatest extent possible, the Panel‟s previous jurisdiction, practices and procedures 
within a statutory framework, including giving the Panel the power to make statutory 
rules.  As such, the hallmark of the Panel‟s takeover regulation is likely to remain 
unchanged.  Further, particular care has been taken to ensure that new legal rights or 
opportunities for tactical litigation are not inadvertently created as a consequence of 
the process of putting takeover regulation on statutory footing.  The CA 2006 
provides for the Panel to act as the competent authority to supervise bids with 
statutory power to make and amend rules in relation to takeover regulation – 
effectively on the basis of the existing Code and the previous mechanisms for 
amending the Code. 
A number of specific statutory powers designed to ensure that parties to a bid 
comply with the rulings of the Panel and to facilitate the Panel in the exercise of its 
supervisory functions have been included in the CA 2006.  Given that no noticeable 
change has been created since the Panel and the Code was put on statutory footing, it 
is very unlikely that the change from self-regulation to statutory regulation will cause 
a culture of tactical litigation.  There are suggestions that “while the implementation 
of the Takeovers Directive by the Companies Act 2006 has not significantly enhanced 
the scope for tactical litigation, there is much more scope for public law litigation than 
had previously been considered to be the case”.10  Whether the change from self-
regulation to statutory regulation makes the Panel more susceptible to judicial review, 
litigants are unlikely to seek judicial review, as the courts are likely to continue 
                                                 
8
 The Takeover Panel, The European Directive on Takeover Bids, Explanatory Paper (The 
Panel on Takeovers and Mergers, London 20 January 2005). 
9
 Article 21 of the Directive requires Member States to bring into force laws implementing the 
Directive by 20 May 2006.  In the UK, the Directive was first implemented by the Interim 
Regulations 2006, which were subsequently replaced by the Companies Act 2006 on 6th 
April 2007; Part 28 of the CA 2006 deals with takeovers. 
10
 See T Ogowewo, “Tactical litigation in takeover contests” (2007) Journal of Business Law 
589, 619. 
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applying the non-intervention principle derived from Datafin,
11
 making litigation less 
attractive.  Moreover, the Government indicated that the provisions in the CA 2006 
would neither undermine nor be inconsistent with the restrictive approach in 
Datafin.
12
  Indeed, as discussed below, the provisions of the CA 2006 take a 
restrictive approach to litigation in takeovers, making it very unlikely that the change 
from self-regulation to statutory regulation will create a culture of tactical litigation. 
 
C. PERCEIVED FEAR OF TACTICAL LITIGATION 
 
The Code has always operated in a non-legal context, and been hailed as providing “a 
quicker, cheaper and more flexible method of regulation, which could not be matched 
by a system based on legal rulings”.13  Indeed, a system of self-regulation has been 
hailed for having advantages ranging from commanding a greater degree of expertise 
and technical knowledge in the relevant area to offering low regulatory costs.
14
  The 
fear has always been that a change from self-regulation to statutory-regulation of 
takeovers, whereby the Code and its enforcement are put on a statutory footing, was 
likely to create “a litigation culture and [cause] delays in the takeover process”.15 
The Panel was keen to maintain a regulatory environment where tactical 
litigation is not prevalent.  An empirical study by Deakin taken over a five-year 
period found that tactical litigation and the use of poison pills and other defences in 
takeovers is very rare in the UK.
16
  The question is whether replacing self-regulation 
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 R v Panel on Takeovers and Mergers, ex parte Datafin plc [1987] QB 815 – discussed 
below. 
12
 Company Law Implementation of The European Directive on Takeover Bids: A 
Consultative Document (London, DTI, January 2005), Para. 2.38. 
13
 M O‟Neill, “When European integration meets corporate harmonisation” (2000) 21 
Company Lawyer 173, 176. 
14
 A Ogus, “Rethinking Self-Regulation” (1995) 15 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 87, 97. 
15
 G Stedman, Takeovers (Harlow, Longman, 1993), 55. 
16
 S Deakin and Others, “Implicit contracts, takeovers, and corporate governance: in the 
shadow of the City Code” (2002) Centre for Business Research, University of Cambridge, 
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with statutory regulation will have the effect of creating in the regulatory environment 
a culture of tactical litigation.  To the Panel, a statutory framework of takeover 
regulation was likely to result in “opportunities for legal challenges and a risk that 
litigation, tactical or otherwise, would increase, thereby causing regulatory difficulties 
– delays, expenses, and a loss of certainty that the Panel‟s rulings were final”.17 
In resisting the statutory regulation of takeovers, the Panel seem to have been 
mindful that it would lose its well-developed strength.  These include flexibility, 
speed and certainty in decision-making.  The Panel prefers to be flexible in its 
decision making to suit a particular circumstance.  For example in Hyder plc, the 
Panel decided, without specific rule in the Code dealing with sealed bids outside offer 
timetable, that offers should be submitted by way of sealed bid.
18
  The purpose here 
was to swart the risk of destabilising the market in the growing speculative share 
prices that were soaring as a result of continued negotiations of the takeover in 
question.  In relation to the perceived fear of litigation, arguably the Panel would lose 
this flexibility if there were to be statutory rules, that tend to be rigid and that may 
require courts‟ intervention if a rule is relaxed without legal basis. 
As a result and as early as 1987, the idea of statutory regulation by way of a 
Directive did not find favour with the Panel.  The Panel argued “if we had a 
                                                                                                                                            
Working Paper 254, 7-14 <http://www.cbr.cam.ac.uk/pdf/WP254.pdf> accessed on 28 
December 2007. 
17
 Panel on Takeovers and Mergers, Report on the Year ended 31 March 1989, 10.  
18
 See Panel Statement 2000/10 and Panel Statement 2000/13 on offers by St David Capital 
plc and WPD Ltd for Hyder plc; see also Panel Statement 1983/13 on offers by Allianz 
Versicherungs AG and BAT Industries plc for Eagle Star Holdings plc; Panel Statement 
1998 on offers by Texas Utilities Company and Pacificcorp for The Energy Group plc; 
Statements 2000/10 of the Panel on Takeovers and mergers, 18 August 2000; for a further 
discussion on the above, see G Morse,  “Assessing the impact of the Takeover Panel's 
Code Committee - Code reform institutionalised?” (2003) Journal of Business Law 314-
333; T Ogowewo, “New Takeover Code rules on exchange offers and auctions” (2002) 
23(6) Company Lawyer 186-191; D Thomas, “Hyder: the rise and fall of a multi-utility” 
(2000) 9 Utilities Policy 181-192. 
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legislative system, the rules would have to be less strict, so giving less protection to 
shareholders, or they would be wide-ranging as at present but without the ability to 
mitigate their potential harshness in appropriate cases”.19  The Panel‟s resistance to 
the Directive has always been due to the fear that “the directive may inadvertently 
create a system which increases the risk of litigation during a takeover and lacks the 
general flexibility that the Panel finds essential in its day to day operations”.20  Given 
that the majority of takeover activities have historically taken place in the UK 
compared to any other European state, it was vital to the success of the Directive that 
the UK was persuaded to go along with the need for a Directive. 
As such, the way forward was to allow the first official proposal, the draft 
Directive of 1989, to reflect the UK aspirations and in particular, to have provisions 
that mirrored the Code.  Indeed, as Johnston says, “those early discussions, with their 
insistence that the Directive should be based on the City Code, exercised a strong 
influence over all subsequent proposals, a policy choice that has been one of the 
impediments to the Directive‟s adoption”.21  However, once the 1989 draft Directive 
was subjected to the wide and varied corporate culture in Europe, the grapes soon 
become sour and the UK sought to abandon the whole idea of the Directive 
altogether, but to no avail. 
The Commission revised the draft Directive and produced a second draft in 
1996.  The Panel feared that the wording of the 1996 draft Directive was still bound to 
result in litigation, with shareholders seeking the intervention of the courts to obtain 
adequate remedies and compensation, which would frustrate takeover bids.  The 
                                                 
19
 Panel on Takeovers and Mergers, Report on the Year ended 31 March 1987. 
20
 Panel on Takeovers and Mergers, Report on the Year ended 31 March 1989, 10. 
21
 A Johnston, “The European Takeover Directive: Ruined by protectionism or respecting 
diversity” (2004) 25 Company Lawyer 270, 270. 
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House of Lords Select Committee on the European Communities agreed with the 
Panel and rejected the 1996 proposal by recommending that it should not be 
adopted.
22
  But the Commission needed the UK‟s involvement for any European 
measure to work, and the UK also needed some kind of European rules in place to 
facilitate cross-border takeovers.  The way forward was to make compromises, which 
also had to take account of the interests of other states.  Edwards explained the basis 
for the process of compromises as an acceptance that “any gain by way of 
harmonisation and improvement in the regulatory systems of other Member States 
would be outweighed by the risk of damage to United Kingdom system”.23  
Notwithstanding the revised 1996 draft Directive, which was designed to minimise 
tactical litigation feared by the Panel, the Panel was of the view that “the risk of 
increased litigation [could] only be eliminated by having no Directive at all”.24 
The softening of the Panel‟s hostility to the idea of the Directive began in 
2000, when for the first time in its annual reports the Panel acknowledged that the 
Directive contained “damage-limitation provisions which should, subject to the 
manner of implementation of the Directive by the UK Government, help to maintain 
the benefits of the Panel‟s non-statutory system of regulation” and “minimise the 
scope for litigation”.25  By 2003, the Panel felt that many of its concerns had been 
resolved, which to the Panel‟s credit was due to the “persistent efforts of the 
Executive working closely and constructively with the Department of Trade and 
Industry and the Commission”.26  By 2005, the Panel was satisfied that the law 
                                                 
22
 The 13th Report of the House of Lords 1995-1996 (Paper 100). 
23
 V Edwards, EC Company Law (Oxford, OUP, 1999), 397. 
24
 Panel on Takeovers and Mergers, Report on the Year ended 31 March 1999. 
25
 Panel on Takeovers and Mergers, Report on the Year ended 31 March 2000, 8. 
26
 Panel on Takeovers and Mergers, Report on the Year ended 31 March 2003, 8. 
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implementing the Directive would be favourable to the extent that it contained 
“measures to ensure that the orderly conduct of bids will not be disrupted by tactical 
Litigation”.27 
Throughout the resistance period, the Panel had the UK Government on board.  
A central plank in the negotiating position taken by the Government on the Directive 
was to minimise the risks associated with the possible increase in tactical litigation.
28
  
The Directive was finally adopted in 2004 by Member States, and implemented in the 
UK by the CA 2006.  As stated by Morse, “many of the substantive provisions of the 
Directive, which are minimum standards only, are derived from the Code and the 
impact of the Directive on the actual rules will, on the whole, be fairly minimal”.29  
Indeed, both the Directive and the CA 2006 are worded carefully to minimise or limit 
any tactical litigation.
30
  With the CA 2006 replicating the Panel‟s rules in the Code, 
tactical litigation is unlikely to increase. 
In implementing the Directive, Part 28 of the CA 2006 in part aims at 
preventing tactical litigation.  Introducing the Bill (that led to the CA 2006) in 
Parliament, Lord Sainsbury of Turville said “the Bill‟s provisions aim to ensure that 
tactical litigation seeking to delay or frustrate a takeover bid will not become a feature 
                                                 
27
 Panel on Takeovers and Mergers, Report on the Year ended 31 March 2005, 13. 
28
 Company Law Implementation of The European Directive on Takeover Bids: A 
Consultative Document (London, DTI, January 2005), para. 2.34. 
29
 G Morse, Charlesworth’s Company Law (London, Sweet & Maxwell, 17th edn, 2005), 676. 
30
 Article 4.6 provides that the „Directive shall not affect the power which courts may have in 
a Member State to decline to hear legal proceedings and to decide whether or not such 
proceedings affect the outcome of a bid. This Directive shall not affect the power of the 
Member States to determine the legal position concerning the liability of supervisory 
authorities or concerning litigation between the parties to a bid‟.  Section 961 CA 2006 
exempts the Panel and its individual members from liability in damages for anything done 
(or omitted to be done) in, or in connection with, the discharge or purported discharge of 
the regulatory functions of the Panel. 
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of our takeover markets”.31  Indeed, the CA 2006 contains clear provisions that are 
intended to limit litigation and make recourse to the courts a matter of last resort. 
Arguably the Panel‟s fear of perceived tactical litigation was not so much 
based on any evidence of such risk but merely on the Panel‟s perceived likelihood of 
loosing its developed policies that underpin takeover regulation in the UK.  Arguably, 
there are four policies that underpin the Panel‟s regulatory framework of takeovers.  
These include equal treatment for all shareholders; adequate and timely advice and 
information; no false markets; and no unapproved frustrating actions.  The question to 
ask is whether the implementation of the Directive changes these policies or in any 
way makes them unworkable.  A close scrutiny of Part 28 CA 2006 reveals that the 
implementation of the Directive does not raise any likelihood of change in these 
underlying policies in the regulation of takeovers in the UK. 
First, the Panel requires that all shareholders must be treated equally during a 
takeover.  A number of rules under the Code demonstrate the Panel‟s commitment to 
treating all shareholders equally during a takeover bid.  For example, Rules 6, 9, 11, 
16, and 20 guarantees equal terms of offer to all shareholders.  In comparison, Article 
3 of the Directive requires the same level of equality.  In implementing the Directive, 
section 943 CA 2006 reverts the matter to the Panel and simply endorses the Code.  
Article 3 of the Directive is now restated in the General Principles of the Code. 
Secondly, the Panel‟s policy is that shareholders should receive adequate and 
timely advice and information.  A number of rules under the Code require that 
shareholders must be given sufficient information to decide on the merits of a 
takeover bid.  For example, Rules 3, 23, 24 and 25 requires that shareholders be given 
                                                 
31
 The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department of Trade and Industry, “Company 
Law Reform Bill”, HL Col 186 11 January 2006 
<http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld199900/ldhansrd/pdvn/lds06/text/60111-
08.htm> accessed on 22 March 2006. 
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advice and information to enable them reach a decision on whether or not to accept a 
takeover offer.  Articles 6 and 9 of the Directive partly deal with the question of 
providing shareholders with adequate information.  Again, section 943 CA 2006 
simply endorses the Code on this matter. 
Thirdly, the Panel requires that companies should not create false markets of 
their shares.  Rules 2 and 8 of the Code regulate the announcement and disclosure of 
offers.  Article 3 of the Directive partly deals with the issue of false market.  This 
Article is implemented by section 943 CA 2006.  The policy against false markets is 
now restated in General Principles 4 and 5 of the Code. 
Fourthly, the Code‟s centrepiece policy is a rule against unauthorised 
frustrating action.  Rule 21 of the Code requires that the offeree board must not 
without the approval of the shareholders take actions that may frustrate a takeover bid.  
Article 9 of the Directive is a replica of Rule 21 of the Code, and section 943 CA 
2006 simply endorses the Code on this matter. 
The implementation of the Directive does not change the policies developed 
by the Panel nor does it make them unworkable.  The regulatory environment 
continues to be governed by the Code.  In implementing the Directive, the CA 2006 
has simply endorsed the Code, thereby retaining all the Panel‟s policies that underpin 
takeover regulation in the UK.  The Code might have changed in the sense of gaining 
legal force but the spirit of the Code is likely to remain.  Whatever might have been 
perceived of the likely effect of the Code acquiring a legal status, increasing tactical 
litigation is unlikely to be one of such effects.  The Panel has power to make rules 
similar to those contained in the Code prior to the implementation of the Directive (s 
943(3) CA 2006), the Panel may make rulings on the interpretation, application or 
effect of the rules (s 945(1) CA 2006), and the Panel‟s ruling on the rules has binding 
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effect (s 945(2) CA 2006).  The Directive is implemented in manner that enables the 
Panel to retain its self-regulation advantages – makings its own rules, interpreting the 
rules, applying the rules and enforcing them on its subjects. 
 
C. COMMON LAW APPROACH RESTRICTING LITIGATION 
 
It is difficult to understand the basis of fears of litigation in takeovers, as the UK 
courts have been at the forefront of discouraging tactical litigation, and have always 
accepted the Panel‟s interpretation of the Code and have only been prepared to 
intervene in exceptional circumstances, leaving the Panel to be the judge and the jury 
in takeover matters.  In some cases, the courts have resisted intervening in takeovers, 
to the extent that where an injunction has been sought, “the very moving for an 
injunction” has in itself been seen as “an action designed to frustrate the making of 
the bid”.32  In other cases, the courts, in the words of Millett J, have been dismayed at 
the “regrettable tendency for the contestants in modern takeover battles to try to enlist 
the aid of the court”.33 
In his judgment in Datafin,
34
 Sir Donaldson MR made it clear: 
 
“[B]eyond a peradventure that in the light of the special nature of the panel, 
its functions, the market in which it is operating, the time scales which are 
inherent in that market and the need to safeguard the position of third parties, 
who may be numbered in thousands, all of whom are entitled to continue to 
trade upon an assumption of the validity of the panel‟s rules and decisions, 
unless and until they are quashed by the court, I should expect the 
relationship between the panel and the court to be historic rather than 
contemporaneous.  … court to allow contemporary decisions to take their 
course, considering the complaint and intervening, if at all, later and in 
                                                 
32
 Dunford & Elliot Ltd v Johnson & Firth Brown Ltd [1977] Lloyd‟s L Rep 505, 510 (per 
Lord Denning MR). 
33
 Re Piccadilly Radio plc (1989) 5 BCC 692, 706 where Millett J refused an injunction to a 
rival bidder who alleged that target shares had been transferred in breach of articles of 
association. 
34
 R v Panel on Takeovers and Mergers, ex parte Datafin plc [1987] QB 815. 
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retrospect by declaratory orders which would enable the panel not to repeat 
any error and would relieve individuals of the disciplinary consequences of 
any erroneous finding of breach of the rules”.35 
 
One of the principles derived from the ruling in Datafin is the non-interventionist 
principle – the relationship between the Panel and the court is to be historic rather 
than contemporaneous.  This principle has two limbs: the courts will not intervene in 
an ongoing takeover case; and the courts will only give guidance to the Panel as to 
how a similar case should be dealt with in the future. 
Taking the non-interventionist principle into account, there would be zero 
incentive for a person to bring judicial review challenging Panel‟s procedure because 
it would not help his case.  It is very likely that the courts will continue to adopt the 
Datafin principle post CA 2006.  That being the case, judicial review would prove 
unhelpful to a litigant.  What would help a litigant is an injunction or a ruling of the 
court in relation to an ongoing takeover case.  The non-intervention principle does not 
interfere with an ongoing takeover case but rather makes declaratory ruling designed 
to advise the Panel on how to deal with future cases.  This partly explains why 
takeover litigation has been rare.  However, the non-interventionist principle has 
never been strictly a legal principle but a practical one.  According to Sir Donaldson 
MR, “when the takeover is in progress the time scales involved are so short and the 
need of the markets and those dealing in them to be able to rely on the rulings of the 
panel is so great that contemporary intervention by the court will usually either be 
impossible or contrary to the public interest”.36 
It is the impracticability of intervention, given the highly fluid nature of the 
takeover market, which makes the courts very reluctant to intervene, not a fetter on 
                                                 
35
 ibid, 842. 
36
 R v Panel on Takeovers and Mergers ex parte Guinness [1989] 1 All ER 509, 512 (per Sir 
Donaldson MR). 
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their discretion.  Although the courts have been reluctant to intervene in takeovers, 
access to the courts has never been curtailed.  Indeed, the courts have always 
maintained that the Panel‟s rulings are subject to judicial review,37 albeit that such 
review is rarely granted.  In appropriate circumstances, the courts would intervene to 
give relief to a litigant, albeit very rarely.  If that is the correct understanding of the 
principle in Datafin, it should explain why, after the ruling in Datafin, the Panel 
continued to fear that tactical litigation would increase. 
In Datafin,
38
 the Panel clearly held the view that if it derived its authority from 
legislation, it would be susceptible to judicial review otherwise not.  The Panel, 
submitted that supervisory jurisdictions of the courts by way of judicial review only 
extended to bodies whose power is derived from legislation or the exercise of the 
prerogative.  Sir John Donaldson MR concluded that the courts has jurisdiction to 
entertain applications for the judicial review of decisions of the Panel.  Although the 
Panel‟s argument failed, its understanding, that is statutory regulation would cause 
judicial review, seems to have lingered on.  However, since Datafin, the courts have 
been reluctant to intervene by way of judicial review or at all in the decisions of the 
Panel.  In Guinness,
39
 although the court condemned the Panel‟s decision as 
“insensitive and unwise”, the Court of Appeal declined to intervene.  In Fayed,40 
again the courts had the opportunity to intervene but the Court of Appeal declined. 
Datafin partly acerbates and partly abrogates the concerns underlying the Panel‟s 
perceived fear of tactical litigation.  First, Datafin applauded the Panel immensely.  
For instance, it was said in Datafin that the Panel‟s “respectability is beyond question.  
                                                 
37
 ibid. 
38
 R v Panel on Takeovers and mergers ex parte Datafin plc [1987] QB 815 (CA). 
39
 R v Panel on Takeovers and Mergers ex p Guinness plc [1990] 1 QB 146. 
40
 R v Panel on Takeovers and Mergers ex p Fayed [1992] BCLC 938. 
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[It] operates in the public interest and [its] enormously wide discretion it arrogates to 
itself is necessary if it is to function efficiently and effectively.  [O]n the relative 
merits of self-regulation and statutory regulation, self-regulation is preferable in the 
public interest”.41  Arguably, describing the Panel in these words must have had the 
effect of acerbating the Panel‟s concerns that it would lose its respectability and 
efficiency if it were to become a statutory body.  As such, Datafin must have given 
the Panel, albeit unwittingly, reason to resist all attempts from Brussels to meddle in 
the Panel‟s remarkable regulatory qualities.  Secondly, Datafin abrogates the 
perceived fears by making it clear that the courts will allow the Panel‟s contemporary 
decisions to take their course, considering the complaint and intervening, if at all, later 
and in retrospect by declaratory orders which would enable the Panel not to repeat any 
error. 
The position at common law is to restrict and discourage tactical litigation.  This 
is applied through the principle of non-intervention developed in Datafin.  Although 
the Panel is subject to judicial review, the courts are reluctant to review the Panel‟s 
decisions.  The question then is whether statutory provisions that implement the 
Directive affect this common law position. 
 
E. STATUTORY PROVISIONS RESTRICTING TACTICAL LITIGATION 
 
Article 4.6 of the Directive makes provision for certain Member States‟ powers to be 
unaffected by the Directive.  These include designation of judicial or other authorities 
responsible for dealing with disputes, the circumstances in which parties may bring 
administrative or judicial proceedings, any capacity of the courts to decline to hear 
                                                 
41
 R v Panel on Takeovers and mergers ex parte Datafin plc [1987] QB 815, 827 (Sir John 
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legal proceedings and the liability of supervisory authorities.  Section 945(2) CA 2006 
provides that a ruling of the Takeover Panel is to have binding effect (subject to 
provisions in the Panel‟s rules and any review or appeal).  Section 951 CA 2006 
provides for matters relating to reviews of and appeals from the decisions of the Panel 
to be contained in the Panel‟s own rules (the Code).  Section 961 CA 2006 provides 
for exemption of the Takeover Panel (and those involved in its functions) from 
liability in damages in certain circumstances related to the regulatory activities of the 
Panel.  Section 956 CA 2006 provides that there shall be no action for breach of 
statutory duty, or any voidness or unenforceability of transactions, as a result of 
breach of rules made by the Panel. 
The UK Government having averred that there might be some potential for 
increased tactical litigation as a result of the new legal framework created by the 
Takeovers Directive,
42
 set out in the CA 2006 to disable any possibility of tactical 
litigation by confining the business of takeovers to the Panel and its rules.  There are 
seven provisions in the CA 2006 that makes it very difficult for a litigation culture to 
develop in takeovers. 
The CA 2006 provides that: 
(1) The Panel has a statutory mandate to supervise and make rules on takeovers, 
including similar rules in the Code.
43
 
(2) The Panel‟s ruling has binding effect, and the Panel can make directions that must 
be complied with.
44
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(3) A party affected by the Panel‟s decision must first go through a review process by 
the Panel‟s Hearings Committee.45 
(4) A party who is still dissatisfied must appeal to the Panel‟s independent tribunal, 
the Takeover Appeal Board.
46
 
(5) The Panel has the right to take a party to court.
47
 
(6) An affected party has no right of action against the Panel for breach of statutory 
duty.
48
 
(7) Unless an affected party can prove bad faith against the Panel, neither the Panel, 
nor its member, officer or staff of the Panel, is to be liable in damages for anything 
done (or omitted to be done) in, or in connection with, the discharge or purported 
discharge of the Panel‟s functions.49 
The seventh restriction on litigation should end all fears the Panel might have 
perceived in the past.  The Panel is immune from prosecution, unless bad faith on the 
part of the Panel can be proved.  This provision helps the Panel avert litigation of the 
kind seen in Three Rivers DC v Bank of England (No 3) (Summary Judgment),
50
 
where depositors blamed the supervisor of UK banking, by then the Bank of England, 
for allegedly failing, in bad faith, to prevent their financial losses resulting from the 
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operations of the BCCI back in 1980.  With all these restrictive provisions of the CA 
2006, it is very unlikely that tactical litigation in respect of takeovers will increase. 
Prior to the implementation of the Directive, the Panel, under the rules 
contained in the Code, has supervised takeover regulation in the UK.  In 
implementing the Directive, the CA 2006 places both the Panel and the Code on a 
statutory footing.  The regulatory framework of takeovers in the UK may have 
changed from a self-regulation to statutory regulation, in theory, but in practice, the 
regulatory framework remains a non-statutory one.  Since 1968 and since the 
implementation of the Directive, takeovers have very rarely, if at all, been the subject 
of litigation. 
The implementation of the Directive maintains the status quo.  In effect, the 
CA 2006 simply makes provisions that reinforce the Panel‟s rule making and quasi-
judicial role in regulation of takeovers.  Nothing in the CA 2006 suggests that the 
Panel will not be subject to judicial review by the courts.   However, the CA 2006 has 
to be read in the context of common law position.  In Datafin, the Court of Appeal 
took the view that judicial review of the Panel‟s decisions takes a retrospective effect.  
The courts will not intervene in an on going takeover process but review the Panel‟s 
decision after the takeover in question is concluded.  This position is very unlikely to 
change.  As such, a culture of litigation is unlikely to develop. 
The provisions in the CA 2006 do not alter the position in Datafin.  Prior to 
coming in force of the CA 2006, the Government indicated its desire to maintain the 
restrictive approach to judicial review under Datafin.  Article 4.6 of the Directive 
allows for such restriction.  Specifically, the Government indicated that the provisions 
in the CA 2006 will neither undermine nor be inconsistent with the restrictive 
approach in Datafin (para 2.38 Consultative Document 2005).  Although case law 
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shows that the decisions of the Panel are subject to judicial review, the CA 2006 itself 
remains silent in this regard.  This is possibly because the Government intended that 
judicial review of the Panel‟s decisions should continued to be governed by Datafin. 
As to general tactical litigation, the CA 2006 clearly makes it very unlikely.  
First, section 951 precludes the possibility of action on ground of breach of statutory 
duty.  Secondly, section 954 provides that takeover transaction cannot be put aside on 
grounds breach of takeover rules.  Thirdly, section 956 provides that parties not 
satisfied with the Panel‟s decisions can only challenge the decisions before the 
Panel‟s own Appeal Tribunal and not in court.  Accordingly, the position in Datafin 
remains unaltered by the CA 2006, and implementation of the Directive leaves the 
Panel‟s status quo unchanged. 
Pursuant to the rules in the Code, since the implementation of the Directive the 
Panel has so far continued to make decisions that have yet been respected by the 
parties concerned.  One of these decisions was in relation to the BAA plc takeover 
process.  Following an announcement by Goldman Sachs Infrastructure Group (the 
“Consortium”) that it was continuing to review its options after its offer proposal had 
been rejected, the Panel ruled on 2 June 2006 that the Consortium should make its 
statement clear.  For the purpose of Note 1 on Rule 19.3 of the Code, the Panel ruled 
that the statement by the Consortium be clarified, and that either by the Consortium 
announcing a firm intention to make an offer under Rule 2.5 of the Code or by 
announcing that it will not proceed with an offer for BAA.  Further, the Panel ruled 
that if the Consortium were not to proceed with the offer, it would be bound by the 
restrictions in Rule 2.8 of the Code for six months from the announcement date.  A 
similar ruling was made on 3 July 2006 against Middleby and Manitowoc in respect of 
the takeover process of Enodis.  All these rulings were respected. 
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The foregoing goes to show that the Panel still maintain its powers of 
decision-making, and that parties involved in takeovers are accustomed to obeying 
takeover rules without resorting to lawsuits.  It is unlikely that the Panel will find it 
necessary to apply to the courts for compliance, but it is too early to rule out the 
possibility of the Panel calling upon the courts to enforce its powers. 
 
F. SPLIT JURISDICTION AND TACTICAL LITIGATION 
 
The Directive provides for split jurisdiction under Article 4(2).  The basic rule under 
Article 4(2) is that a bid will be subject to control by the supervisory authority in the 
Member State where the offeree company has its registered office if the company‟s 
shares are traded on a regulated market in that Member State.  If that is not the case, 
then the supervisory authority is that of the Member State on whose regulated market 
the shares are traded, while the company law obligations would remain to be 
governed by the law of the State of incorporation.  Before the Directive, the Panel had 
jurisdiction where the offeree company was incorporated within the UK with its place 
of central management within the UK, and it was irrelevant where the company‟s 
shares were traded.
51
  In implementing the Directive, the Code provides for the Panel 
to supervise companies that are listed and trading on the London Stock Exchange, but 
are not incorporated in the UK and have their place of central management 
elsewhere.
52
 
As European integration progresses with the increase in freedom of 
establishment and free movement of labour, companies that are incorporated in other 
Member States and get their securities listed and traded only in the UK, are likely to 
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increase.  In those situations, Article 4(2)(e) provides that the Panel will supervise 
“matters relating to the bid procedure” while a supervisor in the state where the 
company is incorporated supervises “matters relating to company law”.  This split 
jurisdiction is common at European Union level, where in banking regulation, 
supervisory jurisdiction is determined by principles of home-country control and host-
country control in European law.
53
  The question here is whether this split jurisdiction 
will become a source of litigation. 
As it would not be in the interest of other regulators or foreign companies not 
to cooperate with the Panel, it is unlikely that the split jurisdiction will cause any 
practical problem.  All regulators have a duty to cooperate with one another.
54
  
Nothing in the Directive prevents intervention by the Commission if cooperation 
between regulators fails.
55
  Companies that engage in takeovers in the UK have a 
vested economic interest that they will not wish to jeopardise by not cooperating with 
the Panel.  Overall, takeovers are but financial transactions, the financial City in the 
UK is accustomed to listening to the Panel, companies that become subject to the 
Panel‟s jurisdiction, be it that they are registered in other Member States, will either 
cooperate with the Panel or find that they have to comply reluctantly with City norms.  
Moreover, “the sanctions that the Panel can employ in response to non-UK investors 
that flout its advice are likely to counteract any erosion of the Panel‟s authority”.56  To 
this extent, it is unlikely that the split jurisdiction will cause litigation. 
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G. CONCLUSION 
 
The implementation of the Takeover Directive placed the Panel and the Code on a 
statutory footing, resulting in an end to self-regulation of takeovers in the UK. This 
change of regulatory framework was always feared for having the potential to create a 
culture of litigation in takeovers.  Article 4(6) of the Directive allows courts of 
Member States to decline to hear legal proceedings.  In implementing this provision, 
the CA 2006 replicates, to the greatest extent possible, the Panel‟s previous 
jurisdiction, practices and procedures, including giving the Panel power to make 
statutory rules, and only allowing courts a limited intervention by way of judicial 
review.  Thus, in implementing the Directive, the CA 2006 has made it difficult for a 
litigation culture to develop in UK takeovers. 
Under section 951 of the CA 2006, an aggrieved party has a number of layers 
to go through before resorting to the courts, which include seeking redress from a 
Hearing Committee of the Panel, and then appealing to an Appeal Board of the Panel.  
Court‟s intervention is limited depending on what the party‟s grounds for redress are.  
For example, section 956 of the CA 2006 does not allow a party to challenge a 
transaction in court on grounds of breach of the Panel‟s rules, and section 961 of the 
CA 2006 exempts the Panel from liability for anything it has done or omitted to do in 
connection with its functions.  With the Panel operating as it has always done under 
self-regulation albeit with legal force, market participants being accustomed to 
resolving matters without resorting to the courts, and given that the CA 2006 limits 
such possibility, a notorious litigation culture is very unlikely to develop in the UK.  
To that extent, the fear that the implementation of the Directive would create a culture 
of tactical litigation remains a myth. 
